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THE “THREAT” OF MARRIAGE FRAUD:
A STORY OF PRECARITY, EXCLUSION,
AND BELONGING
Sarah Pringle*
Migrants can obtain permanent residency in Canada under
the family-reunification category set out in s. 12(1) of the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA).
Canadian citizens or permanent residents may apply to
sponsor their non-citizen spouse, common law or conjugal
partner, or other relatives to move to Canada pursuant to
s. 117(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Regulations (IRPR). The bad-faith clause under s. 4(1) of
the IRPR requires spousal-sponsorship applicants to prove
to visa officers that, on a balance of probabilities, their
relationship is “genuine” and not “entered into primarily
for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under
the [IRPA]”. The bad-faith clause is meant to prevent socalled marriage fraud: the idea that migrants, hoping to
take advantage of the family-reunification regime, trick
vulnerable Canadians into marriage and then
subsequently abandon them once they have obtained
citizenship status. Drawing on the work of feminist, antiracist, and anti-colonial scholars, this paper argues that
the construction of marriage fraud as a threat to national
security rationalizes an increasingly exclusionary spousalsponsorship regime post 9/11. Focusing on this “threat”
detracts from the insidious naturalization of the neoliberal, hetero-patriarchal, and white settler–colonial
values that animate the exclusionary nature of family class
migration—values that pre-date the recent moral panic
over marriage fraud. This paper concludes by sounding a
cautionary bell: Canadians must be wary of the ongoing
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reproduction and sedimentation of exclusionary values
that give meaning to legal constructions of family because
they reinforce and perpetuate experiences of precarity
among migrants who live on the underside of global
capitalism.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Canadian immigration history is replete with examples of
exclusionary policies enacted in the name of national
security.1 As early as 1872, Canada’s immigration regime
sought to exclude migrants that the state identified as
potential security risks.2 While the individuals and groups
labelled as risks have shifted over time, the emphasis on

*

University of Victoria, Faculty of Law.

1

See Sharryn J Aiken, “Manufacturing ‘Terrorists’: Refugees, National
Security, and Canadian Law” (2000) 19:3 Refuge 54 at 54. For
examples of how “national security” has been used to justify the
policing of minorities more broadly within Canadian society, see: Gary
William Kinsman, Dieter K Buse & Mercedes Steedman, eds, Whose
National Security?: Canadian State Surveillance and the Creation of
Enemies (Toronto: Between the Lines, 2000).

2

See Aiken, supra note 1 at 60–61. Aiken provides a comprehensive
overview of the evolution of the “security risk” in Canada’s
immigration regime. The earliest articulation of the amorphous
“security threat” appeared in an 1872 amendment to the Immigration
Act, which provided that “[t]he Governor in Council may, by
proclamation, whenever he deems it necessary, prohibit the landing in
Canada of any criminal, or other vicious class of immigrants, to be
designed by such proclamation.” In 1910, Parliament added s. 41 to the
Immigration Act, which added to the list of prohibited classes: “any
person other than a Canadian citizen [who] advocates in Canada the
overthrow by force or violence in the Government of Great Britain or
Canada, or other British Dominion, Colony, possession or dependency,
or the overthrow by force or violence of constitutional law or
authority”. The scope of section 41 was widened during the “Red
Scare”, and in the inter-war period the Immigration Act provided
government officers with broad discretionary powers to exclude
individuals on the grounds of national security.

4
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security has remained constant.3 This is particularly
apparent in the years following the collapse of the World
Trade Center Towers in 2001, as anti-immigrant
sentiments gained significant traction in North American
discourse.4 Arguably, this trend accelerated with President
3

See ibid at 61–62 (summarized and quoted in this note). Aiken argues
that in the wake of the “Red Scare” and increasing labour unrest
following World War I, Canada used the Immigration Act to bar entry
or deport “anarchists and revolutionaries” who were primarily
suspected communists and union organizers. During World War II,
Canada’s immigration regime provided government officers with
broad discretionary powers to exclude “enemy aliens” on the grounds
of national security. In the post-war period, fear of Soviet infiltration
was the primary security concern guiding immigration policy. In the
1960s, Aiken argues that “[t]he driving force behind measures of
national security and immigration control. . . was the Anglo-Saxon fear
that the influx of foreigners threatened the nation’s ‘racial purity’
and/or political fabric.” In 1977, Parliament established the Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Certain Activities of the RCMP, better
known as the McDonald Commission, which investigated allegations
that the Royal Canadian Mountain Police subjected many groups,
including civil dissidents, to surveillance, infiltration, and “dirty tricks”
under the guise of protecting “national security.” The McDonald
Commission’s second report condemned the overly broad
interpretation of “threats to the security of Canada” in the context of
immigration screening. Aiken argues that Parliament failed to act on
the recommendations of the McDonald Commission, and the safety
and security of Canada continued to feature prominently in Canada’s
admissibility requirements.

4

See e.g. Muhammad Safeer Awan, “Global Terror and the Rise of
Xenophobia/Islamophobia: An Analysis of American Cultural
Production since September 11” (2010) 49:4 Islamic Studies 521. At
525, Awan argues that “[i]n the wake of 9/11 attacks, due to the mythmaking capabilities of the American corporate media, new ‘fears of the
other’ or the immigrant, have been systematically induced in the minds
of the American public.” This is particularly true for Muslim
immigrants, who are often conflated with the threat of terrorism.
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Trump’s political ascendency, imbuing xenophobia with
an unbefitting air of legitimacy.5
Thus, it is no coincidence that Canada’s cardinal
immigration law, the Immigration and Refugee Protection
Act (IRPA),6 emphasizes national security concerns.7
Commenting on the rise of islamophobia in the United States, Ghazali
notes that “the events of 9/11 were used as an excuse to greatly magnify
the hostility toward Muslims and cloak it in pseudo-patriotism.” Abdus
Sattar Ghazali, Islam & Muslims in the Post-9/11 America (Modesto:
Eagle Enterprises, 2008) at 19, cited in ibid at 525.
5

See e.g. Sabrina Siddiqui, “Anti-Muslin rhetoric ‘widespread’ among
candidates in Trump era – report”, The Guardian (22 October 2018),
online:
<www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/22/anti-muslimrhetoric-widespread-among-candidates-trump-era>; Meg Wagner,
Brian Ries & Veronica Rocha, “Supreme Court upholds travel ban”,
CNN Politics (27 June 2018), online: <www.cnn.com/politics/livenews/supreme-court-travelban/h_a32feeafac5231eeded28002e2b2de9d>; Willa Frej, “Trump
Retweets Inflammatory Islamophobic Videos”, Huffington Post (29
November 2017), online: <www.huffingtonpost.ca/entry/trumpretweets-british-far-right_n_5a1e9cd9e4b0cb0e917caaa1>.

6

Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, SC 2001, c 27 [IRPA].

7

See Robert M Russo, “Security, Securitization, and Human Capital:
The New Wave of Canadian Immigration Laws” (2008) 2:8 Intl J
Humanities & Soc Sciences 877 at 881. Russo comments that IRPA
ultimately emphasized national security and public safety, rather than
increasing efficiency and refugee protection measures as initially
intended. He further explains that in the aftermath of the attacks on 11
September 2001, the government quickly promoted the proposed
reforms as Canada’s much needed response to the perceived impending
threat of terrorists. See also Anna Pratt, Securing Borders: Detention
and Deportation in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2005). According
to Pratt, “[t]he government, far from countering the fear-laced
expressions of anti-immigrant, anti-refugee sentiments that followed
the attacks, mobilized and affirmed this fear, further entrenching the

6
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Enacted three months after 9/11, the IRPA proposes to be
“tough on those who pose a threat to Canadian security.”8
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks, mainstream
American media accounts constructed Canada as a
“terrorists’ haven” because the “enemy” could easily
infiltrate the state’s supposed open-border policies.9 Critics
associations between crime-security and fraud and new immigrants
and refugees.” Together, the Anti-Terrorist Act, SC 2001, c 41 and
IRPA comprise Canada’s two-pronged contribution to the “War against
Terrorism.” Ibid at 3.
8

See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade,
Canada’s Actions since the September 11 attacks: Fighting
Terrorism—a Top Priority (Ottawa: DFAIT, 2003), archived online:
<web.archive.org/web/20030924050538/www.dfait.gc.ca/canam/menu-en.asp?act=v&mid=1&cat=10&did=1684>, cited in Erin
Kruger, Marlene Mulder & Bojan Korenic, “Canada after 11
September: Security Measures and ‘Preferred’ Immigrants” (2004)
15:4 Mediterranean Quarterly 72 at 77. For further analysis on how the
IRPA was designed to counter “security threats”, see: Audrey Macklin,
“Borderline Security” in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent
Roach, eds, The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s AntiTerrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 383.
Macklin explains at 384 that: “[t]he Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act casts a wide net over non-citizens rendered inadmissible
on security grounds, expands the detention power over designated
security risks, and reduces access to independent review of Ministerial
security decisions.”

9

See Sunera Thobani, Exalted Subjects: Studies in the Making of Race
and Nation in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007) at
242. See also Colin Freeze, “Canada tarred again as safe haven for
terrorists”, The Globe and Mail (26 April 2002), online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-tarred-again-ashaven-for-terrorists/article4134106/>. This fear mongering continues
to this day. See e.g. John R Schindler, “Canada and the Emerging
Terror Threat From the North”, The Observer (17 December 2015),
online:
<observer.com/2015/12/canada-and-the-emerging-terror-
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have observed that since 2001, the Canadian imaginary has
conflated this so-called enemy with immigrants from
certain countries, leading to calls for increased
securitization and surveillance at the border.10 In a time
where xenophobia is on the rise around the world,11 there
could not be a more critical moment to interrogate the ways
in which Canadian laws produce and sustain systemic
discrimination against migrants who come to this country
hoping to build a better life.
The family-reunification category codified under
s. 12(1) of the IRPA is one pathway to citizenship in
Canada. Known more commonly as the spousal
sponsorship program, the family class system permits
Canadian citizens or permanent residents to sponsor their
non-citizen spouse, common law, or conjugal partner, as
well as other relatives, to migrate to Canada pursuant to
s. 117(1)(a) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection

threat-from-the-north/>. In Schindler’s article, he warns that “nobody
really knows how many terrorists are lurking in Canada.” Throughout
the article, Schindler refers to the “threat” posed by America’s northern
border as the radical Jihadists (which he often refers to simply as
“Muslims”) who have flocked to Canada because of the government’s
historically open approach to immigration and its weak border security
practices.
10

See Kruger, Mulder & Korenic, supra note 8 at 72–87. See also
Thobani, supra note 9.

11

See e.g. John Cassidy, “It’s Time to Confront the Threat of Right-Wing
Terrorism”, The New Yorker (16 March 2019), online:
<www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/its-time-to-confront-thethreat-of-right-wing-terrorism>. Cassidy documents the correlation
between the rise of white nationalism and the violent massacres
perpetrated by white supremacist terrorists in recent years.

8
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Regulations (IRPR).12 If an immigration officer approves
the sponsorship application, the migrant spouse obtains
permanent residency.13
A spousal-sponsorship application must satisfy the
bad-faith clause under s. 4(1) of the IRPR. Applicants must
prove to visa officers that, on a balance of probabilities,14
their relationship is “genuine” and not “entered into
primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or
privilege under the [IRPA].”15 The task of the visa officer
12

Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227. The
IRPA grants broad regulatory power to the Minister so that many of the
substantive rules are contained within regulations and can be created
without recourse to Parliament. See Lorne Waldman, Canadian
Immigration & Refugee Law Practice (Toronto: LexisNexis Canada,
2018) at 17.

13

See Chantal Desloges, Cathryn Sawicki & Lynn Fournier-Ruggles,
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Law: A Practitioner’s Handbook,
2nd ed (Toronto: Edmond, 2017) at 207.

14

In Gonzalez v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2014
FC 201 at para 15, the Federal Court clarified that “[t]o say the burden
of proof was upon the applicant is not the same as saying there was a
presumption that the marriage was entered into for immigration
purposes.” Minor inconsistencies do not necessarily lead to the
conclusion of bad faith.

15

This requirement is codified in s. 4(1) of the IRPR: “For the purposes
of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be considered a
spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner of a person if the
marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal partnership (a) was
entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or
privilege under the Act; or (b) is not genuine.” Neither the IRPR nor
the IRPA defines “genuine”, but in Sandhu v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 834 [Sandhu], the Federal
Court adopted the Immigration Appeal Division of the Immigration
Refugee Board’s statement that: “[g]enuineness of the marriage may
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is to determine “what was going on in the applicant’s head,
or arguably, heart.”16 Ultimately, a Canadian immigration
officer exercises their discretion to approve or refuse the
application.17
The bad-faith clause responds to the so-called
threat of marriage fraud: a narrative advanced by
politicians across the spectrum18 that migrants, hoping to
often be assessed through external manifestations and may be
evidenced by the degree of interaction and consequent knowledge
demonstrated by the [couple].” Genuineness will be returned to in Part
IV of this paper.
16

See Gill v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2012]
IADD No 624 [Gill] at para 19, as cited in Sandhu, supra note 15 at
para 14. Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-Ruggles, supra note 13,
provide the following examples of the type of evidence that may be
required. When assessing the genuineness of a marriage, the visa
officer will evaluate whether a wedding actually took place by
reviewing photographs, certificates and other documents (ibid at 222);
if the couple is common-law, the officer will review documentation
proving cohabitation, and in some instances, conduct interviews, and
occasionally surprise home visits (ibid at 222). Conjugal relationships,
on the other hand, are an exception that only apply when marriage or
common law partnerships are not possible (ibid at 214). Evidence must
be provided that shows significant commitment, notwithstanding that
the couple did not get married, and do not cohabitate (ibid at 214). This
may include: “insurance policies or estates showing that they have
named each other as beneficiaries; documents showing that they hold
joint ownership of possessions; and documents showing that they hold
joint expenses or shared income” (ibid at 214).

17

See Vic Satzewich, “Canadian Visa Officers and the Social
Construction of ‘Real’ Spousal Relationships” (2014) 51:1 Can Rev
Sociology 1 at 4.

18

The Harper government’s anti-marriage-fraud campaign video is still
on the Government of Canada’s website. See it here: Government of

10
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take advantage of s. 12(1), trick vulnerable Canadians into
marriage and then abandon them once they have obtained
citizenship status. The data proving that this phenomenon
is prevalent, let alone on the rise, is ambiguous at best.
Concrete evidence put forward by lobbyist groups,
politicians, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC)19
fails to provide a consistent picture.20 On one hand, groups
like the Canadians Against Marriage Fraud, former
Immigration Minister Jason Kenney, and the IRCC suggest
that there are thousands of victims in Canada—even as
many as 1,500 defrauded each year.21 On the other hand,
Canada, “Marriage Fraud: Stories From Victims” (date modified: 8
June
2018),
online:
The
Government
of
Canada
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/news/video/marriage-fraud-stories-victims.html>.
19

Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) was renamed IRCC in late
2015 by the Liberal government.

20

See Megan Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family: The (Re-) Production
of Conjugal Citizens through Canadian Immigration Policy and
Practice (PhD Dissertation, Queen’s University, 2013) [unpublished]
at 208–09 [Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family].

21

Canadians Against Marriage Fraud alleges that 1,500 Canadians fall
victim to marriage fraud each year. See Zosia Bielski, “Many
Canadians who sponsor a foreign spouse find themselves jilted”, The
Globe
and
Mail
(30
April
2009),
online:
<www.theglobeandmail.com/life/relationships/many-canadians-whosponsor-a-foreign-spouse-find-themselves-jilted/article570171/>.
Former Immigration Minister Jason Kenney claimed that there were
thousands of victims in Canada. See Jason Kenney, “Speaking Notes
at an Event to Announce Changes to Spousal Sponsorship” (News
Conference to Announce Changes to Spousal Sponsorship,
Mississauga,
2
March
2012),
online:
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-
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reports from the CBSA suggest that these numbers are
inflated. Between 2008 and 2010, there were 200 cases
reported, only seven of which resulted in charges.22
Similarly, between 2010 and 2014, there were 392 referrals
made to CBSA, resulting in seven charges laid, with only
three concluding with a guilty finding.23 The exaggerated
numbers are misleading due to the difference between
reported incidences of marriage fraud and proved cases of
marriage fraud.24
Politicians have not explained the inconsistent
evidence of marriage fraud in legislative proceedings.
Rupaleem Bhuyan, Anna C Korteweg, and Karin Baqi
found that members of Parliament regularly ask
representatives of the IRCC to share the rates of fraud in
light of recent attention to the issue. 25 While avoiding
citizenship/news/archives/speeches-2012/jason-kenney-minister2012-03-02.html>. IRCC has reportedly stated that 1,000 fraudulent
marriages are reported per year. See Raveena Aulakh, “Fastest Way to
Get Into Canada—marriage”, The Star (16 July 2010), online:
<www.thestar.com/news/canada/2010/07/16/fastest_way_to_get_to_c
anada_marriage.html>.
22

See The Canadian Press, “Marriage fraud targeted by Canada border
agency”,
CBC
News
(1
November
2011),
online:
<www.cbc.ca/news/politics/marriage-fraud-targeted-by-canadaborder-agency-1.1003652>.

23

See House of Commons, Standing Committee on Citizenship and
Immigration, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 41-2, No 15 (4
March 2014) at 1543 (Mr Geffrey Leckey (Director General,
Enforcement and Intelligence Operations Division, CBSA)).

24

See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20.

25

See Rupaleem Bhuyan, Anna C Korteweg & Karin Baqi, “Regulating
Spousal Migration through Canada’s Multiple Border Strategy: The

12
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giving any tangible evidence, IRCC’s responses reproduce
two assumptions: (1) that fraud is real and can be
accurately detected and (2) that visa officers require more
resources to improve their capacity to detect fraud.26 This
cyclical logic masks the fact that no problem has been
proved with any degree of certainty in the first place.
Although touted as an issue of national concern, it is
difficult to know whether, and to what extent, this threat
actually exists.
Drawing on the work of feminist, anti-racist, and
anti-colonial scholars, this paper argues that the
construction of marriage fraud as a threat to national
security rationalizes an increasingly exclusionary spousalsponsorship regime post 9/11. Focusing on this threat
detracts from the insidious naturalization of the neo-liberal,
hetero-patriarchal, and white settler–colonial values that
animate the exclusionary nature of family class migration
—values that pre-date the recent moral panic over marriage
fraud. We must be wary of the ongoing reproduction and
sedimentation of such values, because they reinforce and
perpetuate experiences of precarity among migrants who
live on the underside of global capitalism.27

Gendered and Racialized Effects of Structurally Embedded Borders”
(2018) 40:4 Law & Pol’y 346 at 354.
26

See ibid.

27

The use of the term precarity throughout this paper is informed by the
work of Judith Butler. See Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life
Grievable? (London: Verso, 2009) at 25: all life is “precarious”
because it “can be expunged at will or by accident…[its] persistence is
in no sense guaranteed.” In this sense, “precariousness” describes “the
fact that one’s life is always in some sense in the hands of the other. It
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This paper will be structured as follows. The first
section sets the foundation by explaining how stories
around terrorist threats and national security have been
used to justify heightened scrutiny of prospective
immigrants in the years since 9/11. The second section
situates the purported threat of marriage fraud within this
climate of fear by demonstrating how it resulted in
intensified securitization of Canada’s borders. The third
section evaluates how the exclusionary nature of spousal
sponsorship reveals the underlying neo-liberal, heteropatriarchal, and white settler–colonial assumptions of
Canada’s immigration system. The fourth section turns to
how these theoretical underpinnings manifest in tangibly
precarious conditions for migrants who are deemed
undesirable by the Canadian state. The final section calls
for a subversive retelling of this story, rendering visible the
divisive, authoritarian, and exclusionary settler state
practices that operate under the guise of national security
and maintain global relations of inequality and oppression.

implies exposure both to those we know and to those we do not know.”
Ibid at 14. Importantly, although all lives are equally defined by
precariousness, it does not follow that all lives are equally precarious;
indeed, for Butler, precarity is unequally distributed, leaving some
bodies more vulnerable to violence than others. Although political
orders are designed to address the needs, Butler deploys the term
precarity to designate the “politically induced condition in which
certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks
of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and
death.” Ibid at 25. These populations live in the vanguard of war,
neoliberalism, and climate crises, and are denied the social value and
recognition that is ascribed to others. Such populations are at
“heightened risk of disease, poverty, starvation, displacement, and of
exposure to violence without protection.” Ibid.

14
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In embarking on this project, I am mindful of how
Canada’s nation-state continues to occupy Indigenous
land, and how notions of national identity have historically
been predicated on the Othering of migrants of colour and
Indigenous peoples. In the words of Indigenous scholar
Andrea Smith, “a liberatory vision for immigrant rights is
one that is based less on pathways to citizenship in a settler
state, than on questioning the logics of the settler state
itself.”28
II. DISCOURSES AROUND TERRORISM AND
NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST-9/11 ERA
In order to understand the panic surrounding marriage
fraud, we must first situate it within a cultural moment
where white settler societies have become increasingly
hostile to migrants of colour, and Muslims in particular. In
the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, mainstream media
identified the “enemy” as the “radical Muslim” who was
seen as “anti-Western, fanatic, and uncivilized in nature.”29
In contrast, Western settler nation-states, like America and
Canada, were framed as bastions of liberalism, democracy,
freedom, and the rule of law.30 Edward Said explains this
28

See Andrea Smith, “Foreword” in Harsha Walia, Undoing Border
Imperialism (Oakland: Institute for Anarchist Studies, 2013) at 2.

29

See Thobani, supra note 9 at 218.

30

See ibid at 222. In reality, the forcible displacement of migrants at
greater rates than ever before is by virtue of a global political economy
driven by Western colonialism and capitalism: Walia, supra note 28 at
54. For example, people from Afghanistan and Iraq compose the
world’s largest recent refugee populations. Harsha Walia points out
that “[w]ith decades of foreign intrusion, including the US and NATO
occupations that began in 2001, these two countries have been subject
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dichotomy, observing that the West constructs its own
sense of identity out of stories premised on the
“ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and
Oriental inferiority.”31
The War on Terror is symptomatic of this Westerncentric worldview. Countries in the West invade the
Middle East under the assumption that Eastern countries
pose a threat because “they detest our freedoms, they detest
our society, they detest our liberties.”32 Migrants from
these countries, in turn, come to embody this perceived
assault on Western values and freedoms.
Importantly, in the post-9/11 era, the climate of fear
and distrust is pervasive, directed indiscriminately at
Muslims and other groups marked by difference. Critical
race and feminist scholar Sunera Thobani points out that:
[i]f the figure of the Muslim is today being
used to represent the most potent threat to
to the destruction of their infrastructure, privatization of their
economies, interference in their governance, and military missions that
have killed and tortured over one million people”: ibid. Thus, the
migrants are displaced from a context devastated by western
interventions, which may be described as imperialist, extending and
imposing Western rule over the Middle East “colonies”: ibid at 41–42.
31

See Thobani, supra note 9 at 228, quoting Edward Said, Orientalism:
Western Conceptions of the Orient (London: Penguin, 1978).

32

Canada’s Chief of Defence Staff described the “opponent” in
Afghanistan as “detestable murderers and scumbags, I’ll tell you that
right up front. They detest our freedoms, they detest our society, they
detest our liberties.” Daniel Leblanc & Shawna Richer, “He’s
Armoured, But He’s Not Thick”, The Globe and Mail (30 July 2005),
cited in Thobani, supra note 9 at 235.

16
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national security, the racialization of the
categories ‘Muslim’ and ‘immigrant’ means
that all people of colour who ‘look’ like
‘Muslims’ (that is, who are Black and
Brown), are being constituted as part of this
danger, regardless of their legal status.33
It is within this context that Western stories of
threat frame deviations from whiteness as something to be
feared; something that challenges Canada’s own national
identity as a freedom-loving democracy. Thus, the
heightened anxieties around the Radical Muslim within the
(white) national psyche post 9/11 increased suspicion of all
racialized migrants.
III. SECURING CANADIAN BORDERS AGAINST
THE “THREAT” OF MARRIAGE FRAUD
Concerns about marriage fraud emerge within this wider
moral panic about “keeping borders safe and secure” from
the Other who seeks to “penetrate” North America’s
“vulnerable shores.”34 In 2009,35 then Immigration
Minister Jason Kenney launched an aggressive campaign
aimed at cracking down on marriage fraud, arguing that
“. . . [it] poses a significant threat to our immigration

33

Ibid at 246.

34

See Walia, supra note 28 at 54.

35

See Megan Gaucher, A Family Matter: Citizenship, Conjugal
Relationships, and Canadian Immigration Policy, (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2018) at 122 [Gaucher, A Family Matter]. According to
Gaucher, the issue of marriage fraud did not receive much attention
before the government’s policy position was identified in 2010.
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system.”36 After conducting a series of town hall meetings
across the country, Kenney became a spokesperson for the
cause.37 Under his leadership, the government of Canada
released numerous videos that shared victim’s stories and
warned Canadians that the danger of marriage scams was
on the rise.38 He claimed that this “abuse of the system” has
victimized thousands of innocent Canadians, who were
“being lied to and deceived.”39 Where the sponsor is
complicit in the operation, Kenney argued that marriage
fraud amounts to human smuggling.40 Kenney also warned
that the livelihood of all Canadians are implicated;
marriage fraud takes its toll on “our taxpayer benefits such
as health care” and other social services, including
welfare.41
Although the Liberal government repealed one of
the legislative changes enacted by the former Harper
government, which will be elaborated on later in this
article, the former Immigration Minister under Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau, Ahmed Hussen, was sure to
emphasize that the Liberal government was “doubly
36

Kenney, supra note 21.

37

See Steven Meurrens, “Addressing Concerns About Marriage Fraud”,
Policy Options Politiques (9 November 2017), online:
<policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/november-2017/addressingconcerns-about-marriage-fraud/>.

38

See Kenney, supra note 21.
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See ibid. See also Christina Gabriel, “Framing Families: NeoLiberalism within Canadian Immigration Policy” (2017) 38:1 Atlantis
179 at 187.
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See Kenney, supra note 21.
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committed” to combatting the threat of marriage fraud like
its predecessor.42 Indeed, much of Kenney’s anti-marriagefraud campaign remains on the government’s website. For
example, it still cautions Canadians to “think carefully
before marrying someone and sponsoring them to come to
Canada” because “[s]ome people think marriage to a
Canadian citizen will be their ticket to [citizenship].”43
This section will show how the fear around
marriage fraud legitimized stricter enforcement of
Canada’s borders, traceable in two broader transformations
to the spousal-sponsorship program. First, legislative
changes were enacted, including a widened bad faith
clause, a five-year sponsorship restriction, and a
conditional permanent resident provision. Second,
procedural changes were implemented, including
specialized training and the expansion of anti-fraud units
beyond Canada’s borders. As will be explained at the end
of this section, while these changes took place to the
spousal-sponsorship program, the government expanded
its security and surveillance mechanisms targeting

42

See Kathleen Harris, “Liberals ‘doubly committed’ to tackling
marriage fraud while ending 2-year spousal residency rule”, CBC News
(28 April 2017), online: <www.cbc.ca/news/politics/liberalimmigration-marriage-fraud-1.4090694>.

43

Government of Canada, “Protect Yourself from Marriage Fraud” (last
modified 1 May 2020), online: Government of Canada
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/services/protect-fraud/marriage-fraud.html>.
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migrants applying under all immigration classes, both here
and abroad.
A. LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES
In 2010, under the direction of Kenney, IRCC increased the
number of marital, common-law, or conjugal relationships
that could be excluded on the grounds of bad faith. Before
2010, visa officers denied applications under the bad-faith
clause only where the relationship was both disingenuous
and entered into primarily for immigration purposes.44 In
2010, the IRCC changed the wording of the provision to a
disjunctive test; now, either element can compromise an
application and there is no need for both. In other words,
an application can be rejected if it was genuine but entered
into primarily for immigration purposes, or if it was
disingenuous but not entered into primarily for
immigration purposes. Since the onus is on the applicant to
prove that the relationship was entered into in good faith
on a balance of probabilities, an applicant must now negate
both elements to have a successful application.45

44

See e.g. Gill v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2007 CanLII
62947 (Immigration Appeal Division), as cited by Stephen Green &
Alex Stojicevic, Chair, National Citizenship and Immigration Law
Section of the Canadian Bar Association, “Regulations Amending the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (Bad faith), Canada
Gazette, Part I” (3 April 2010), online: The Canadian Bar Association
<www.cba.org/CMSPages/GetFile.aspx?guid=6b689ddd-0057-4f4290aa-4e69da411349> [Green & Stojicevic]. The Immigration Appeal
Division found that although it appeared the applicant entered into
marriage with the appellant primarily for immigration reasons, it was
nonetheless a genuine relationship of permanence.

45

See Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-Ruggles, supra note 13 at 222.
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Writing on behalf of the National Citizenship and
Immigration Section of the Canadian Bar Association,
Alex Stojicevic criticized the change, arguing that a
disjunctive test may be prejudicial to cultures that practice
arranged marriages where immigration prospects are an
important factor to be considered.46 As well, it may be
illogical, potentially targeting couples who choose to marry
in order to stay together, with a genuine intention to be with
one another permanently.47
The next year, along with creating a tip line to
report citizenship fraud,48 Kenney’s department introduced
two regulations that further tightened spousal sponsorship
as a pathway to Canadian citizenship. First, he introduced
a five-year sponsorship restriction for sponsored spouses,
beginning on the day they are granted permanent residence,
as a way to deter the “revolving door” of family status
migrants coming to Canada.49 Second, he introduced the
controversial conditional permanent residence (CPR)

46

See Green & Stojicevic, supra note 44 at 3–4.

47

See ibid.

48

See Gloria Suhasini, “A new tip line to report citizenship fraud” (15
September
2011),
online:
Canadian
Immigrant
<canadianimmigrant.ca/news/a-new-tip-line-to-report-citizenshipfraud>.

49

See Steven Meurrens, “Sponsorship bar and conditional permanent
residency in effect” (9 February 2013), online: Canadian Immigrant
<canadianimmigrant.ca/immigrate/sponsorship-bar-and-conditionalpermanent-residency-in-effect>.
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provision,50 which instituted a two-year co-habitation
requirement for newcomers sponsored by their spouses.
The CPR provision was subsequently repealed by
the Liberal government because it fuelled widespread
concern that forcing spouses to cohabitate for two years
exacerbated vulnerabilities among victims of domestic
abuse. Although the CPR had an exception for spouses who
were subject to abuse or neglect, critics argued that it
nonetheless deterred individuals from coming forward
because, not only were they in fear that they would lose
their permanent-residence status, they also were greatly
reliant on their sponsors due to vulnerabilities such as
language
proficiency,
isolation,
and
financial
51
dependence. Since they are more likely to come to
Canada as dependent spouses52 and because women are

50

See the Liberal government’s official statement on the repeal, where
they emphasize their commitment to family reunification and
prevention of gendered sexual violence. Government of Canada,
“Notice – Government of Canada Eliminates Conditional Permanent
Residence” (28 April 2017), online: Government of Canada
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/news/notices/elminating-conditional-pr.html>.

51

See Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 144.

52

“In 2017, the sponsored spouses, partners and children category was
composed of 57% women and 43% men.” Hon Ahmed Hussen,
Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, “2018
Annual Report to Parliament on Immigration” (last modified 26
February
2019),
online:
Government
of
Canada
<www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugeescitizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/annual-report-parliamentimmigration-2018/report.html#message>.
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more likely to be subject to abuse,53 this was seen to have
a disproportionate impact on female migrants.
That being said, the problem of vulnerability
among spouses who are subject to abuse still exists,
notwithstanding the repeal of the CPR provision. As will
be expanded on below, the government still does not
provide any socio-economic support to sponsorship
recipients. Without access to a social safety net, abused
spouses remain deeply reliant on their sponsors for
financial and social support in a time of significant
alienation and cultural transition.
B. PROCEDURAL RESPONSES
Along with these legislative measures, the government
enacted several changes to the way in which spousalsponsorship applications are processed. In 2012, Kenney
announced that visa officers54 would complete
“supplementary marriage-fraud identification training”,

53

See e.g. Government of Canada, “Family violence: How big is the
problem in Canada?” (last modified 31 May 2018), online:
Government
of
Canada
<www.canada.ca/en/publichealth/services/health-promotion/stop-family-violence/problemcanada.html>.

54

See Government of Canada, “Inventory: Foreign Service Development
Program” (last modified 16 June 2020), online: Government of Canada
Jobs
<emploisfp-psjobs.cfp-psc.gc.ca/psrssrfp/applicant/page1800?toggleLanguage=en&poster=1200120>. The
immigration officers who process and decide applications are stationed
within Canadian embassies, high commissions, and consulates in other
countries. They are Canadians who work abroad, employed through
the Foreign Service Development Program.
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the specifics of which the government never revealed to the
public.55
However, in 2015, immigration lawyer Steven
Meurrens obtained a three-page training guide through an
access-to-information request.56 Titled “Evidence of
Relationship”, the guide contained red flags that visa
officers ought to look out for. Examples of supposed red
flags included “university-educated Chinese nationals
marrying non-Chinese”, “sponsor is uneducated, with a
low-paying job or on welfare”, and couples who had “no
diamond rings”.57 Predictably, the guide caused an uproar
in the media, with many alleging that racist, classist, and
cultural stereotypes pervade training for border officials.
The red flag targeting Chinese applicants was no
surprise for those who followed the anti-marriage fraud
campaign. Kenney’s department was very explicit about
how applications from certain countries, namely India and
China, should be viewed with heightened suspicion. It was
alleged that Indian and Chinese applicants were more
likely to be part of sophisticated networks of organized
marriage fraud. Singling out India specifically, in
Citizenship and Immigration Committee meetings, Kenney
referred to a “wall of shame” at the Canadian visa office in
the Indian city of Chandigarh, comprised of accumulated
forged documents, including fake death certificates and
55

Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 145.
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See Nicholas Keung, “Immigration guide for Detecting marriage fraud
called ‘racist and offensive’”, Toronto Star (19 May 2015), online:
<www.thestar.com/news/immigration/2015/05/19/immigrationguide-for-detecting-marriage-fraud-called-racist-and-offensive.html>.
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university diplomas.58 Yet, scholar Megan Gaucher points
out that both the government and the IRCC failed to prove
that marriage fraud is higher in these countries and that this
level of suspicion is warranted.59 Indeed, the government
provided minimal empirical data to support this claim.60
Nonetheless, the application process became
increasingly intensive in India and China. The differential
treatment of applicants from certain countries led one
immigration officer to observe: “[c]ase assessment is
entirely dependent on the area in which you’re located.
When I was in London, cases were rarely refused. When I
was stationed in Delhi, couples were considered guilty
until proven innocent.”61 Anti-fraud units were established
in New Delhi and China, and all applicants had to be
interviewed abroad to quell concerns about marriage fraud.
Here we see what Rupaleem Bhuyan, Anna C Korteweg,
and Karin Baqi speak of when they argue that threats of
fraud operate as a device that extends the frontier of
Canadian border control beyond Canada’s territory.62 By
fixating on China and India and establishing enforcement
mechanisms beyond Canadian borders, immigration
officers detect and intercept what are perceived as
undesirable migrants before they even enter Canada.63
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See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20 at 225.
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See ibid at 226–27.
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See ibid.
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Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 150.
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See Bhuyan, Korteweg, & Baqi, supra note 25.
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As we have seen, the purported threat posed by
marriage fraud justified a series of restrictive measures that
tightened spousal sponsorship as a pathway to citizenship.
However, it is important to point out that this part of the
immigration regime was already exclusionary. The recent
crackdown on marriage fraud is only the most recent
example in a long history of legislative measures aimed at
protecting a certain version of the Canadian family.
Although Canada’s immigration regime has
historically purported to prioritize family reunification,
certain types of families have been afforded easier passage
than others: namely, families that emulate, in organization
and socio-economic background, the Canadian nuclear
family.64 As Gaucher argues, family reunification “is about
the state producing and reproducing a desirable familial
form through the provision of citizenship.”65 In the next
section, this paper will expand on how family class
migration is deeply informed by biases that allow for the
inclusion of some people over others.

64

See Cindy L Baldassi, “DNA, Discrimination and the Definition of
Family Class: M.A.O. v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and
Immigration)” (2007) 21 J L & Soc Pol’y 5 at 29–30. An obvious
example is Canada’s history of prohibiting or restricting the entry of
migrant families from specific countries or racial backgrounds. See
ibid at 6. See e.g. Agnes Calliste, “Race, Gender and Canadian
Immigration Policy: Blacks from the Caribbean, 1900–1932” (1993–
94) 28:4 Journal of Canadian Studies 131; Beverley Baines, “When is
Past Discrimination Un/Constitutional? The Chinese Canadian
Redress Case” (2002) 65:2 Sask L Rev 573 at 585.
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Gaucher, A Family Matter, supra note 35 at 19.
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IV. NEO-LIBERALISM, HETERO-PATRIARCHY,
AND WHITE SETTLER–COLONIALISM
The fears surrounding marriage fraud expose three
underlying forces that give meaning to ideas around
Canadian citizenship. First, consistent with the wider neoliberal ideology that animates Canada’s immigration law,
the intensified scrutiny of spouses reflects an active effort
to exclude migrants who are seen as potential financial
burdens on the welfare state. Second, the normative logic
guiding the genuineness assessment of marital, common
law, and conjugal relationships reinforces white heteropatriarchal ideas of marriage and marriage-like
relationships. Third, by only recognizing marriages
solemnized through formalistic law here and abroad, the
assessment process evinces a continued propagation of
settler–colonial ideas in the construction of the desirable
migrant subject. I will deal with each in turn.
A. NEO-LIBERALISM
As Abu-Laban and Gabriel observe, under neo-liberal
logic, “the ‘best’ immigrants are those whose labourmarket skills [would] enhance Canada’s competitive
position in a world economy.”66 Migrants deemed “selfsufficient” and “highly skilled” are actively sought after.67
66

Yasmeen Abu-Laban & Christina Gabriel, Selling Diversity:
Immigration, Multiculturalism, Employment Equity and Globalization,
(Peterborough, ON: Broadview Press, 2002) at 62, cited in Gaucher, A
Family Matter, supra note 35 at 62.

67

See Gabriel, supra note 39 at 181. Ironically, economic-class migrants
include both “the principal applicant and spouses and dependents of
the applicant if they migrate together.” But since “the principal
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Meanwhile, migrants who are viewed as needy are not only
given less priority, but also targeted as security concerns
who merit stricter conditions.68 Given that sponsored
spouses are explicitly thought of as dependants, family
class migrants are considered an undesirable group due to
the potential financial drain on the welfare state. There is
an assumption “that ‘dependent’ family members lack
skills and are unproductive, and that people of the ‘wrong’
origins make excessive use of the family reunification
program.”69
The spousal-sponsorship regime prevents family
class migrants from becoming the fiscal responsibility of
the state in two ways. First, it disincentivizes participation
in the program because applicants are subject to the
undertaking requirement. The undertaking amounts to a
“de facto privatization of basic social security”70 by
ensuring that the full financial responsibility of the
incoming migrant rests on the sponsor. As alluded to in the
introduction, under the IRPR, a sponsor must undertake to
become financially responsible for spouses for a duration

applicant is the public face of this category”, the stigma of dependents
is overshadowed by the primary applicant’s perceived “human capital
and ability to contribute to Canada’s global competitiveness.” Ibid.
68

See Chizuru Nobe-Ghelani, “Inner Border Making in Canada: Tracing
Gendered and Raced Processes of Immigration Policy Changes
Between 2006 and 2015” (2017) 77 Can Rev Soc Policy 44 at 47.

69

Gillian Creese, Isabel Dyck & Arlene Tigar McLaren, “The ‘Flexible’
Immigrant? Human Capital Discourse, the Family Household and
Labour Market Strategies” (2008) 9:3 J Intl Migration & Integration
269 at 270 as cited by Gabriel, supra note 39 at 181.

70

Gabriel, supra note 39 at 182.
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of at least three years.71 This means that the sponsor
ensures that the family members are supported so that they
will not require social assistance from the government. If
social assistance payments are made, the sponsor agrees to
repay the government in full. Once this undertaking is in
force, the sponsor cannot revoke it for any reason,
including relationship breakdown, abuse, or fraud. If
sponsors are deemed to have defaulted on their
undertaking, they will not be allowed to sponsor other
family members until they have repaid the government.
The second way that the spousal-sponsorship
regime prevents unwanted costs on the welfare state is by
requiring sponsors, who immigrated to Canada themselves,
to disclose any dependents in their initial immigration
application. That way, immigration officials can assess the
risk of any future financial liability before even granting
the primary applicant citizenship. Section 117(9)(d) of the
IRPR provides that the failure of a sponsor to disclose a
dependent at the time they applied for permanent residency
will result in those undisclosed dependents being excluded
from the family class in the future.72 The obligation to
disclose begins at the time the application is filed and
continues until permanent residence is granted.

71

However, if they also sponsor dependent children, it could be as long
as ten years or until they turn twenty-two, whatever comes first. See
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, SOR/2002-227, s
132(1)(b).

72

See de Guzman v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),
2005 FCA 436. This provision has been upheld as intra vires and
constitutional by the Federal Court of Appeal.
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Although aiming to deter misrepresentation, this
requirement prevents permanent residents from acting as a
sponsor even where their non-disclosure was innocent or
unintended. An applicant’s intentions or reasons for nondisclosure are irrelevant under s 117(9)(d).73 This has at
times produced absurd results. In Munganza v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration),74 the applicant
did not disclose his wife and child because he thought they
had died in a civil war. Consequently, the wife and child
could not apply under the family class pursuant to
s. 117(9)(d) of the IRPR.75 The only available recourse that
applicants have to overcome the overly broad and harsh
effects of this provision is to apply for consideration on
humanitarian and compassionate grounds.76

73

See Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-Ruggles, supra note 13 at 217.
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Munganza v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2008
FC 1250 [Munganza].
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In Munganza, supra note 73, the Federal Court at para 13 states: “I am
prepared to accept that the applicant was not aware that his wife and
children were still alive when his application for permanent residence
was filed. This situation has no effect on the application of paragraph
117(9)(d) of the Regulations. The Regulations are clear: paragraph
117(9)(d) does not make any distinction with regard to the reason for
which there was no mention of the non-accompanying family members
in the application for permanent residence. What is important is that
result of the non-disclosure was that these members were not examined
by an immigration officer. In this case, it is true that the applicant could
not disclose what he did not know, but the wording of the Regulations
is clear and unequivocal; subjective knowledge regarding a false
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By requiring the sponsor to enter into an
undertaking and disclose their dependents, the state ensures
that any costs associated with integration into Canadian
society rests with the individual sponsor. Consequently,
only those who are sufficiently financially secure may
sponsor spouses. Indeed, the state ensures that this is the
case by barring sponsorship applications from individuals
who are on social assistance, in default of child or spousal
support, already in default under IRPA, or who are
undischarged bankrupts. The consequence of calibrating
immigration policy to the needs of Canada’s national
economic project is that the border systemically deprives
migrants who are perceived as indigent, or even potentially
indigent, of equal access to Canadian citizenship. In the
words of Nobe-Ghelani, such exclusionary border
practices create two categories of migrants: those who are
deserving of Canadian rights and entitlements, and those
who are not. 77 Here, the undeserving migrant is one who
poses a financial risk to the state.
Marriage fraud undermines the ability of the state
to prevent the migration of individuals presumed to pose a
financial risk. Sponsored spouses who abscond from their
partners may not have the economic and social support that
would otherwise be guaranteed by a sponsor. Thus, such
spouses are viewed as more likely to amount to a long-term
economic burden on the state.

77

Nobe-Ghelani, supra 68 at 50.
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B. WHITE HETERO-PATRIARCHY
The threat posed to the state by sponsored spouses is not
just financial. A closer look at the application criteria for
the spousal-sponsorship program reveals that Canadian
immigration law facilitates the reproduction of white
heteropatriarchy through the privileging of the conjugal,
monogamous, nuclear family. As pointed out by Jamie R
Wood, this family form operates to “cast other
structures . . . as deviant, dangerous and unworthy of equal
recognition.”78 Problematically, families that orient
themselves around norms other than those of conjugality
and monogamy—kinship formations that challenge
heteropatriarchy—are excluded from this framework.
1. Conjugality
The assessment criteria that determines whether a
relationship is genuine relies upon certain assumptions
around what comprises the idealized family. One such
assumption is that marriages and marriage-like
relationships must be conjugal in nature.79 The IRPA and
IRPR do not define the word conjugal, but its central
features derive from the Supreme Court of Canada decision
in M v. H.80 The Court provided a non-exhaustive list of
indicia for conjugal relationships drawn from the decision
78

Jamie R Wood, “Moving Beyond the Bedrooms of Our Nation:
Redefining Canadian Families from the Perspective of Non-Conjugal
Caregiving” (2008) 13:1 Appeal 7 at 11.

79

Under the spousal-sponsorship program, conjugality is a requirement
for citizenship for spousal applicants. See Gaucher, Keeping it in the
Family, supra note 20.

80

M v H, [1999] 2 SCR 3 at para 59, 171 DLR (4th) 577.
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of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Molodowich v.
Penttinen,81 including shared shelter (sleeping
arrangements), sexual and personal behaviour (fidelity,
commitment, feelings toward each other), services
(conduct and habit with respect to the sharing of household
chores), social activities (their attitude and conduct as a
couple in the community and with their families),
economic support (financial arrangements, ownership of
property), children (attitude and conduct concerning
children), and societal perception of the couple.82
According to Megan Gaucher, these relational attributes
reflect how “conjugal relationships are measured against
characteristics believed to be part of the ideal marriage”,83
or more specifically, “how judges imagine marriage ought
to be.”84
Under the Molodowich framework, what separates
a conjugal/marital relationship from a mere economic
partnership is the presence of emotional and physical
intimacy, care, and fidelity—features that are fundamental
to social constructions of the Western nuclear family.85 By
binding intimacy to citizenship, Anne Marie D’Aoust
suggests that “technologies of love” play a role in
regulating migration flows, disciplining those migrants
81

Molodowich v Penttinen, [1980] OJ No 1904 (QL), 17 RFL (2d) 376
(ONSC) [Molodowich].

82

See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20 at 63.
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Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder,“What is Marriage-Like Like? The
Irrelevance of Conjugality” (2001) 18:2 Can J Fam L 269 at 290, as
cited in ibid.

85

See Gaucher, Keeping it in the Family, supra note 20 at 68.
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who do not embody Western narratives of romance and
kinship. 86 Additionally, emphasis on care87 reinforces
social constructs of idealized domesticity, reproducing
heteronormative and gendered divisions of labour within
the household. Finally, the cherishing of fidelity inscribes
monogamy as the naturalized kinship formation; as will be
explained below, this comes at the exclusion of more
radical conceptions of family and gender relations.
While same-sex couples are eligible to apply under
the spousal-sponsorship regime,88 only those couples that
embody narrow racial, class, gender, and national ideals of
86

See Anne Marie D’Aoust, “In the Name of Love: Marriage Migration,
Governmentality, and Technologies of Love” (2013) 7:3 Int’l Political
Sociology 258 at 263–64.

87

See Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice: Psychological Theory and
Women’s Development, 2nd ed (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1993). In this work, the feminist scholar introduces the concept
of “an ethic of care” to describe the differential moral development
among women that emphasizes attentiveness, responsibility,
competence, and responsiveness in interpersonal relationships and
conflict. Gilligan’s work is critical of how, by reason of being
feminized, “an ethic of care” is devalued. Instead, under her view, an
“ethic of care” is a human strength which can and should be taught to,
and expected of, everyone. However, in the context of assessing
conjugality in spousal-sponsorship applications, “care” is likely not
expected in the same way for both parties. Since patriarchal gender
roles inform the viewpoint under which these assessments are made,
the ability of a woman migrant to care for her sponsor would likely be
more carefully scrutinized than vice versa. Given that the regime,
through undertakings, reifies a relationship of economic dependency,
sponsored spouses/partners are often embedded within a domestic
hierarchy that reproduces an unequal, gendered division of labor.
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See Desloges, Sawicki & Fournier-Ruggles, supra note 13 at 236–38.
This is subject to an important caveat: the marriage must be legal both
in Canada and the applicant’s home country.
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conjugality satisfy the legal requirement of genuineness.
Rahul Rao describes the mainstream acceptance of some
queer relationships as “the ruse through which neoliberal
capitalism pretends to become more inclusive.”89
Meanwhile, relationships that defy hegemonic
understandings of conjugality are still relegated to the
margins.
By predicating citizenship on the performance of
conjugality, the sponsorship regime reproduces the nuclear
family as the cornerstone to Canada’s ideal kinship
formation. This is reflective of how, according to Eithne
Luibhéid and Lionel Cantú, the state ascribes membership
to those whose sexual values correspond with national
values.90 Under this view, immigration control acts as a
mechanism for “constructing, enforcing, and normalizing
dominant forms of heteronormativity while producing
figures as supposed threats.”91
89

See Rahul Rao, “Global Homocapitalism” (2015) 194 Radical
Philosophy 38 at 44, 47.

90

See Eithne Luibhéid & Lionel Cantú, eds, Queer Migrations:
Sexuality, U.S. Citizenship and Border Crossings (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2005), as cited by Gaucher, Keeping it
in the Family, supra note 20 at 40. Gaucher summarizes Luibhéid’s
argument as follows: “Luibhéid defines heteronormativity as ‘a range
of normalizing discourses and practices that seek to cultivate and
privilege a heterosexual population while nonetheless insisting that
heterosexuality is ‘natural’ and timeless rather than a product of
economic, society, culture and political struggle’ (2008, 296). For
Luibhéid, immigration scholarship disregards connections between
heteronormativity, sexuality and immigration, despite the fact that
sexuality ‘structures every aspect of immigrant experiences (2004,
227).’”
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2. Monogamy
As we have seen, monogamy is a crucial element in the
assessment of whether a marital, common law, and
conjugal relationship is genuine. This means that the
spousal-sponsorship regime prohibits polyamory. Since
the spousal-sponsorship regime requires that the marriage
be legal under Canadian law,92 spouses of polygamous or
bigamous relationships, which are explicitly prohibited due
to their criminalization under ss. 293 and 290 of the
Criminal Code,93 are inadmissible.
Polygamy has been seen as a familial arrangement
that undermines the institution of marriage, the Canadian
family, and society at large.94 Some feminists would agree
with this characterization, arguing that women are
disenfranchised in such relationships and Canada should
not endorse them within its borders.95 Admittedly, to the
extent that they reinforce gendered hierarchies, some
polygamous familial formations can be extremely

92

See the definition of marriage under s. 2 of the IRPR.
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Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46. As will be explained below,
provisions in the Zero Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act,
SC 2015, c 29, specifically target polygamy as an inadmissible union
within the spousal-sponsorship program.

94
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exploitative, especially where there are “issues with lack of
consent, and abuse of women and children.”96
However, we should not be so quick to dismiss or
essentialize
non-monogamous
familial
relations.
Polygamous relationships are not inherently problematic
and in fact, may be emancipatory in certain contexts. For
example, some feminists have argued that polygamy
presents a possible remedy to the inequitable division of
household labor by “[providing] a ‘sisterhood’ within
marriage, [generating] more adults committed to balancing
work/family obligations, and [allowing] more leisure time
for each wife.”97 Elizabeth Joseph, a lawyer and
polygamist wife in Utah, went so far as to describe her life
as representing “the ultimate feminist lifestyle.”98
Whether or not that’s true, Michelle Chan points
out that “[w]hile the practice of polygamy is certainly not
without problems, neither is the practice of monogamy.”99
Indeed, feminists have long critiqued monogamy as a
central feature of the nuclear family, which perpetuates
96
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“inequality, gender roles, gender hierarchy, and male
power.”100 Beyond that, monogamy far from guarantees a
successful relationship: as of 2008, “43.1% of Canadian
marriages are expected to end in divorce before the couple
reaches their 50th wedding anniversary.”101 It seems
hypocritical to base Canada’s immigration policy around
the idea that monogamy is the only way to achieve
domestic bliss when that ideal is not a reality for many
Canadian families.
Decrying polygamy and upholding monogamy as
the idealized alternative also reflects how the social
construction of family in Canada is laden with racist
assumptions. Critical race legal scholar Adrien Katherine
Wing notes that “in the twenty-first century, polygamy
continues to exist in many parts of the world, particularly
countries where women of color live.”102 Though neutral
on its face, the exclusion of polygamous spouses
disproportionately impacts applicants of colour, while also
buttressing a national identity built upon Euro-Western
value systems. Nowhere is this more explicit than the Zero
Tolerance for Barbaric Cultural Practices Act, enacted by
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the Harper government in 2014.103 The spousalsponsorship program was already anchored in monogamy
by allowing a permanent resident to sponsor only one
spouse, but the Bill took this one step further by adding the
practice of polygamy as a new ground of inadmissibility.
Then Immigration Minister Chris Alexander stated that
“[w]e intend [on] sending a very clear message to anyone
coming to Canada that such practices are unacceptable.”104
Sherene Razack observes that Westerners point to
Eastern practices of polygamy as backwards and barbaric
patriarchal violence, which in turn, constructs Western
civilization as progressive and free from gender
oppression.105 Thus, the exclusion of polygamous
relationships from Canada’s spousal-sponsorship regime is
not only related to the continued centrality of the nuclear
family; it arises from discourses that reinforce “the
dichotomy between a civilized, Western ‘Us’ and a
barbaric, non-Western ‘Them’.”106
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By privileging monogamy and engaging in
Orientalist discourses, the spousal-sponsorship regime
neuters polygamy’s potential to disrupt the (white) nuclear
family as the naturalized kinship form. We are left with a
further sedimentation of a white hetero-patriarchal
institution at the centre of Canada’s body politic, to the
detriment of more radical imaginings of gendered and
racial relations in society.
C. THE NATURALIZATION OF SETTLER–
COLONIAL SOVEREIGNTY
The dissonance between policy and reality is also evident
when considering the naturalization of settler–colonial
sovereignty, and how it has informed immigration policy.
By only recognizing state law as a means in which a
marriage can be solemnized, Canada’s spousalsponsorship program reinforces the legitimacy of the
colonial nation state by erasing the historical and
contemporary existence of Indigenous laws. The IRPR
require that foreign marriages be “valid both under the laws
of the jurisdictions where it took place and under Canadian
law.”107 Therefore, marriages that occur according to
Indigenous law are not legal for the purposes of spousal
migration.
In this way, Canada’s spousal-sponsorship scheme
fails to recognize the sovereignty of Indigenous legal
orders around the world. Yet, this should not be surprising:
the very idea of the Canadian state acting as an arbiter in
determining if and under what conditions people migrate is
predicated on the erasure of Indigenous law. Critical to the
107
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legitimacy of the claim that the “Crown acquired radical or
underlying title to all the land”108 is the displacement of
Indigenous people and their laws from the historic
landscape. This displacement is the basic premise of terra
nullius (“nobody’s land”),109 which has been used to
legitimize colonial expansion for centuries. Indigenous and
critical race scholars have long contended that the driving
force of Canada’s nation-building project is the ongoing
colonization of Indigenous land, people, and history.110
Canada’s spousal-sponsorship scheme is yet another
example of how the Canadian state buttresses its own
legitimacy by undermining Indigenous legal orders.
Obtaining citizenship through unregulated means
undermines the authority of the settler state to assert
sovereignty over the territory known as Canada. This raises
larger questions about the legitimacy of the settler state and
its control over, and proprietary relationship to, territory.
Such questions cannot be meaningfully addressed within
the parameters of this paper, but warrant further thought,
research, and action.
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Within the confines of this project, a story worth
telling still emerges: the desire to protect colonial
sovereignty, neoliberalism, and white hetero-patriarchy
illuminates why marriage fraud constitutes such a threat in
the Canadian imaginary—it not only imposes a cost on the
state; it also disrupts the nation’s own story about itself by
denaturalizing what is seen as objective truths regarding
the conjugal family and Canadian sovereignty over its
borders.
As Sara Ahmed points out, “[t]hese narratives or
scripts do not, of course, simply exist ‘out there’ to legislate
the political actions of states. They also shape bodies and
lives.”111 The next section departs from the theoretical, in
the hope of portraying how these systems operate in
tangible and violent ways in everyday life for migrants
living in the borderlands.
V. COLLATERAL HARMS OF EXCLUSIONARY
APPROACHES TO SPOUSAL MIGRATION
This paper has aimed to demonstrate that Canadian
citizenship is predicated on one’s ability to perform
spousal-hood according to Western notions of neoliberalism, white hetero-patriarchy, and settler colonial
identity. Framing certain people as threats to justify their
exclusion reinforces conditions of precarity amongst nonstatus women in Canada.
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Migrant women who find their way to Canada, and
for whom spousal-sponsorship applications have not been
successful, may have no choice but to remain here in the
shadows, dodging the watchful gaze of immigration
officials in order to avoid forcible return to localities
afflicted by political, social, and economic unrest. This
section will focus on the plight of non-status migrant
women, who live in constant fear of deportation, to further
delineate how constructions of the ideal citizen
compromise the livelihoods of those who exist in the
margins. In doing so, I hope to further problematize why
people denied status are labelled threats to national
security.
In an open letter to Prime Minister Justin Trudeau,
the Non-Status Women’s Collective of Montreal asks that
the government live up to its promise to “take immediate
steps to reopen Canada’s doors, and . . . make reuniting
families a top priority.”112 For these women, “who live and
work in the shadows, invisible and excluded”,113 precarity
characterizes everyday existence. As Peter Nyers observes,
“[f]or non-status immigrants, the borderline is not just at
physical entry points at ports, airports, and land crossings.
Rather, the border exists wherever and whenever they try
to claim the rights of social citizenship.”114 There is no
112
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infrastructure in place to ensure that non-status women are
able to meet their basic needs and those of their children.115
For example, non-status migrants have restricted access to
social services, including public education, healthcare,
food banks, and subsidized housing.116
Not only do they live under the constant fear of
deportation and without access to social services, nonstatus migrant women do not have the ability to participate
in the regulated workforce. Jobs open to non-status women
have been described as dead-end jobs that are rife with
problematic labor conditions.117 As Roxana Ng notes:
They are available on short-term, temporary,
or even on an emergency basis. Working
hours are also extremely irregular, ranging
from a temporary, on-call basis in domestic
and kitchen work to shift work in factories
and hotels. Very few of them . . . are protected
by labour standard legislation and union
contracts. Fringe benefits . . . are not
provided.118
Thus, even if they are able to work, that work is
precarious and not amenable to the cultivation and
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sustenance of a life lived with dignity. Moreover, language
and job training programs, which may facilitate the ability
to integrate into Canada’s labour market, not only risk
exposure to immigration authorities, they are also
expensive, and therefore inaccessible to those who are
already economically insecure.
Non-status migrants also cannot access the justice
system because to do so may risk deportation.119 This is
especially problematic in situations of domestic and sexual
violence. Non-status women who report abuse face
additional problems, as summarized by Susan McDonald:
Fear of deportation, cultural biases,
communication barriers, education and
economic barriers, medical problems,
relocation of partners, host country
perceptions, and distrust or fear of the legal
system.120
According to some anti-racist feminists, racialized
migrant women may view the family as a safe place from
the harsh realities of Canadian society, despite the presence
of violence in their lives.121 This only exacerbates the
vulnerability of non-status migrant women in Canada.
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Problematically, migrant women have indicated that abuse
either began or intensified upon immigration.122
Although not all non-status people are equally
vulnerable, a common characteristic is the absence of
social, civil, and political rights that are entitlements of
permanent residence and citizenship. As we have seen,
non-status women are relegated to the margins of society,
with precarity as a way of life. Given what we know about
which migrants are more likely to be selected—those who
more readily fit the mold of the desirable migrant—it is
important to consider how the denial of sponsorship further
reinforces socio-economic inequities that are already in
place.
This is not to say that non-status women should be
viewed as passive victims. As evident by the Non-Status
Women’s Collective of Montreal, they have agency and
provide an important voice of resistance to Canada’s
exclusionary nation-state building project. Arguably, it is
their ability to draw into question the logics of the
Canadian state and imagine alternative and more equitable
futures that makes them perceived as a threat in the first
place. However, the realities of precarity are inconsistent
with the state’s foregrounding of the threat posed by
migrants to national security. If anything, it is their lives
that are threatened by myths, like marriage fraud, that
further justify exclusionary attitudes, policies, and
communities.

122

Ibid at 258.

46

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 33, 2020]

VI. REIMAGINING BORDERS AND BELONGING
The provision of citizenship “is about the state producing
and reproducing a desirable familial form”,123 which in
turn is “definitive of the state itself.”124 Borders are the
means by which Canada can curate its population and
sustain “the dichotomy between a civilized, Western ‘us’
and a barbaric, non-Western ‘Them’.”125 Thus, it is perhaps
unsurprising that marriage fraud, viewed as an
undermining of the border and of the Canadian family, is
seen as a national threat—notwithstanding the lack of
empirical evidence suggesting that anyone is in any danger.
Marriage fraud not only interferes with the state’s ability to
decide which bodies it will grant access to and
economically support, it also constitutes a broader
challenge to social organization through the nuclear family
and the legitimacy of the sovereign state.
In the context of the War on Terror, framing
marriage fraud in the discourse of threat and national
security stokes public fears and anxieties about migrants,
which in turn, justifies more exclusionary border practices.
And, troublingly, the emotive power of fear inoculates
Canadian border practices from allegations of racism, even
though officer practice manuals show cause for concern.
The state can justify its targeted actions by pointing to its
campaign to protect citizens from migrants hoping to scam
the system. Canadians feel safer, as does the future of
liberty and freedom in Canada’s democracy. This story
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leaves little room for questioning the broader effort to
exclude migrants that the state deems both undesirable and
threatening to national security.
We must retell the stories that are taken as inherent
truths; in our context, these stories include those that
monger fear around the supposed threat posed to western
society by marriage fraud and more broadly, the Other.
According to Donna Haraway, “the power to survive”
arises “on the basis of seizing the tools to mark the world
that marked them as other.”126 These tools are the “stories
. . . that reverse and displace the hierarchical dualisms of
naturalized identities.”127 Perhaps by speaking to the
insidious violence of the innocent and freedom-loving
West that threatens the daily lives of those in the margins,
we can thereby subvert “the structure and modes of
reproduction of ‘Western’ identity.”128 In so doing, we can
unsettle the white sensibility of who belongs and who does
not. This paper is trying to do just that.
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